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1 Introduction
Following Green (1972) we shall say that an economy possesses the equal treat-
ment property, if for each allocation from the core, agents of the same type (i.e.
with the same endowments and tastes) receive the equally desired commodity
bundles. If the property stated above is fulfilled for a given allocation, we shall
say that allocation possesses equal treatment property.
Equal treatment property was first established apparently by Debreu and Scarf
(1963) for finite economy. A slight and immediate generalization of this result
(see Green 1972) asserts that finite economy in which the numbers of agents of
the same type have a greatest common divisor not less than two possesses the
equal treatment property.
Obviously, an arbitrary competitive allocation treats the agents of the same
type equally. This property is therefore necessary for an economy to have the
core equivalence property, i.e. the property of coincidence of the core and the
set of competitive equilibria. On the other hand, the proof of core equivalence
theorem is often carried out by establishing some variants of the equal treatment
property (see e.g., Gabszewicz and Mertens 1971 and Green 1972).
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We are considering atomless pure exchange economies. Aumann’s Core
Equivalence Theorem entails that if an atomless economy satisfies some con-
ditions (such as continuity, desirability of preferences, strict positivity of total
endowments etc.) then it possesses the equal treatment property. It is shown here
that in atomless economies “equal treatment property holds coalitionally” i.e.
similar members of two identical coalitions receive equally desired bundles at
?-core allocations (see Definition in Sect. 3) without any condition on the data of
economy (Theorem 1). From that result validity of equal treatment property for
?-core allocations is derived. From this in turn, equal treatment property for atom-
less economies satisfying minimal conditions (continuity and local insatiability
of preferences) is derived. Notice that the situation for the finite economies is
opposite to the situation in atomless economies. Namely, it was shown by Green
(1972) that if the greatest common divisor of the numbers of the agents of the
same type is equal to one, then for almost all initial assignments (in the sense
of Lebesgue measure on the space of all initial assignments) equal treatment
property doesn’t hold.
2 The model
We consider the well-known continual model of exchange of` different com-
modities between continuum of agentsE = {(T, Σ, ν), (X, ω,t )}, where
(T, Σ, ν) is a finite atomless measure space of agents,X i correspondence ofT
into the commodity spaceRl describing the consumption sets of agents,ω is aν-
integrable function ofT into Rl , describing the distribution of initial endowments
and for eacht ∈ T, t is a preference relation of agentt , which is an arbitrary
irreflexive binary relation onX(t). We suppose that the family of preferences
t (t ∈ T) is measurable, i.e. the set{(t , x, y) ∈ T × Rl × Rl : x t y} belongs
to the productΣ-algebraΣν ⊗ B l ⊗ B l , whereΣν denotes the completion of
Σ relative toν, B l theΣ-algebra of the Borel subsets inRl . It will be assumed
also that correspondenceX is (Σ, B l )-measurable.
For an arbitrary two vectorsx, y ∈ X(t) we will denotex ∼t y, if neither
x t y nor y t x. It should be noted that the relation∼t is reflexive, symmetric
but not transitive relation and hence it is not an equivalence relation. For aν-
integrable functionx : T → Rl , notations∫ x and∫E x will mean ν-integral of
x over T and overE ∈ Σ, respectively; so∫ x = ∫T x.
An assignmentis a ν-integrable functionx : T → Rl such thatx(t) ∈ X(t)
for ν-almost all t ∈ T. An allocation is an assignmentx satisfying condition∫
x =
∫
ω. A coalition is aΣ-measurable subset ofT with positiveν-measure.
An assignmenty dominatesan allocationx via coalitionE, if 1) y(t) t x(t) for
t ∈ E, 2) ∫E y = ∫E ω. The set of all undominated allocations is calleda coreof
economyE and is denoted byC(E ).
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3 Equal treatment property of core allocations
Definition (Shitovitz, 1973, p. 479).An assignmenty ?-dominates an alloca-
tion x via coalition S (S is said to?-block x), if (1) ν(R) > 0, where R= {t ∈





The set of all?-undominated allocations of economyE will be called?-core of
economyE and denoted by C?(E ).
Theorem 1. Let E = {(T, Σ, ν), (X(t), ω(t),t ), t ∈ T} be an atomless pure
exchange economy. LetT1, T2 ∈ Σ be disjoint coalitions such that there ex-
ists a one-to-one measure preserving mappingϕ : T1 → T2 such thatX(t) =
X(ϕ(t)), ω(t) = ω(ϕ(t)) andt =ϕ(t) for t ∈ T1. Then forx(·) ∈ C?(E )
x(t) ∼t x(ϕ(t)) for almost all t ∈ T1. (1)
Proof. Suppose that for an allocationx(·) ∈ C?(E ) relation (1) is not satisfied.
In this case, by passing if necessary, to the subsets ofT1 andT2, we can see that
there exists a coalitionA1 ∈ Σ, such that
x(ϕ(t)) t x(t) for t ∈ A1. (2)




S ω, ν(S)) for S ∈ Σ. Obviouslym is (2l + 1)-vector measure
on (T, Σ). By Liapunov’s Theorem there existB1 ⊂ A1 and B2 ⊂ A2, where








Two cases are possible:
1) B2 = ϕ(B1) up to a set ofν measure zero. In this case again by Liapunov’s




m(A2 \ B2) (4).





Clearly the setsB1 andC1 = ϕ−1(C2) are disjoint (up to a set ofν-measure zero).
Denote byD1 = B1 ∪ C1 and
y(t) =
{
x(t) for t ∈ T \ C1,
x(ϕ(t)) for t ∈ C1.




m(T \ A) (7)






























































It is clear thaty(t) = x(t) for t ∈ B1 ∪ E, and y(t) = x(ϕ(t)) t x(t) for
t ∈ C1, by (2), i.e.y(·) ?-dominatesx(·) via coalitionS.
2) B2 /= ϕ(B1) (up to a set ofν-measure zero). PutG2 = B2 \ ϕ(B1) and G1 =




x(ϕ(t)) for t ∈ G1,
x(t) for t ∈ T \ G1,
and let E be chosen as in the case 1). PutS = E ∪ M . We assert thaty(·)



























































































On the other hand
y(t) = x(t) for t ∈ S \ G1, and y(t) = x(ϕ(t)) t x(t) for t ∈ G1.
Moreoverν(G1) > 0. Therefore assignmenty(·) ?-dominatesx(·) via coalitionS.
Thus we have seen that in both cases there exists assignmenty(·) ?-dominating
allocationx(·), which contradicts tox(·) ∈ C?(E ).
Remark 1.Since the Liapunov Convexity Theorem fails for an arbitrary infinite
dimensional space (see e.g. Diestel and Uhl (1977)) the above proof of Theorem 1
is not valid for the case of infinite dimensional commodity space. Nevertheless we
conjecture that Theorem 1 holds for an arbitrary infinite dimensional commodity
space, but as yet have been unable to prove this conjecture.
Theorem 2 from Kingman and Robertson (1968) allows to state that if initial
endowments of agents are not “too dispersed” then Theorem 1 holds for each not
“too dispersed”∗-core allocation. We consider a functionz : T → E, whereE
is a locally convex space, as not “too dispersed” if the following set of integrable
functions{〈z, f 〉(t) = 〈z(t), f 〉, t ∈ T| f ∈ E′}, whereE′ is a topological dual
of E, is thin. For the definition of last term see Kingman and Robertson (1968).
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If (X, A, µ) and (Y , B , ν) are measure spaces,a point isomorphismbetween
X and Y is a one-to-one mappingJ from almost all ofX on almost all ofY
such thatE ∈ A if and only if F = J (E) ∈ B , and thenµ(E) = ν(F ). A finite
measure space is said to benormal measure spaceif it is point isomorphic to a
finite interval with Lebesgue measure. The original definition of normal measure
space given by Halmos P. and J. von Neumann (1942) is different from the
one given above. The equivalence of the two definitions was established in their
Geometric Isomorphism Theorem (p. 339, Theorem 2).
Corollary. Assume that in atomless economyE = {(T , Σ, ν), (X , w,)},
where(T, Σ, ν) is a normal space, T0 is any coalition of agents with the same
initial data, i.e. (X(t), ω(t),t ) = (X, ω,) for t ∈ T0 and x(·) ∈ C?(E ). Then
x(t1) ∼ x(t2) for t1, t2 ∈ T ′0, where T′0 ⊂ T0 andν(T ′0) = ν(T0).
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exist disjoint coalitionsA1, A2, such that
x(t2)  x(t1), ∀t1 ∈ A1, ∀t2 ∈ A2. (7)
Since measureν is atomless, we can assume thatν(A1) = ν(A2) (see Halmos,
1974, p. 174, Exercise 2). Moreover, we can assume thatA1, A2 are Borel subsets
of T in the sense of Halmos-Neumann (1942). By Lemmas 1 and 3 from Halmos-
Neumann (1942)A1, A2 are normal spaces. Applying the Geometric Isomorphism
Theorem we obtain a measure preserving mappingϕ : A1 → A2. Then by
Theorem 1x(t) ∼ x(ϕ(t)), for each t ∈ A1. Contradiction between this and
relations (7) proves the corollary.
Observe that in Theorem 1 no assumption other than that of non-atomicity of
measureν is made on the data of the model. Moreover, if some assumptions on
the data of economy are made then the core of economy coincides with the set
of Walras allocations and therefore for such models equitability property holds.
Now we will derive this property directly from Theorem 1 thereby dispensing
with price mechanism. First we give the following lemma, which strengthens the
corresponding result (Lemma 4) from (Shitovitz 1973); in particular, desirability
of preferencest is not assumed in this lemma.
Lemma. Let t (t ∈ T) be continuous and locally non-satiable in economyE .
Then, if an assignment y?-dominates x via coalition E, then there exists an assign-
ment z which dominates x via the same coalition E. Therefore under considered
assumptions?-core coincides with the core of economyE , i.e. C?(E ) = C (E ).
For the Proofof Lemma see Appendix. It will be seen that this proof, unlike that
of Lemma 4 in Shitovitz (1973) is direct and doesn’t use any results concerning
exchange models.
Theorem 2. Let in economyE preferencest (t ∈ T) be continuous and locally
insatiable. Then assertion of Theorem 1 holds for an arbitrary allocation x from
the core C(E ) of economyE .
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Remark 2.All the above results easily generalize to the case of economies with
production. SupposeE = {(T , Σ, ν), (X , ω,) , Y } is a production econ-
omy described in Hildenbrand (1968). Recall that hereY is the (production)
correspondence fromΣ into Rl satisfying relevant conditions (see Hildenbrand
1968). In this case Definition of?-domination should be given as follows: an
assignmenty ?-dominates an allocationx via coalitionS, if (1) ν(R) > 0, where
R = {t ∈ S : y(t) t x(t)}, (2) for almost all t ∈ S \ R, y(t) = x(t) and (3)∫
S y ∈
∫
S ω +Y(S). In Theorem 1 mappingϕ : T1 → T2 must satisfy in addition,
assumptionY(E) = Y(ϕ(E)) for eachE ∈ Σ, E ∈ T1.
Appendix
The Appendix is devoted to the establishment of one proposition concerning in-
tegral of correspondence and a proof of the Lemma, which asserts coincidence
of the ?-core and core of economy. Note that this Lemma under stronger as-
sumptions was proved in by Shitovitz (1973).
We use the standard notations. Symbol‖ · ‖ stands for Euclid norm inRl
and Bδ(x) for an open ball inRl with center atx and radiusδ. For a subsetA
of Rl denote byA and ∂A its closure and boundary, respectively. For a point
a ∈ Rl and a subsetA ⊂ Rl denote by dist (a, A) distance betweena and A.
For a correspondenceX : T → 2Rl , where (T, Σ, ν) is a finite measure space,
the set of all measurable selectors ofX denote byLX . By X : T → 2Rl denote a
correspondence defined byX(t) = X(t) for t ∈ T.
Proposition. Let (T, Σ, ν) be a finite measure space and let X: T → 2Rl be a
non-empty open measurable corespondence. Let y∈ LX be integrable and such
that y(t) ∈ X(t) for t ∈ T0, where T0 ∈ Σ, ν(T0) > 0. Then
∫
y ∈ ∫ X , i.e. there





Proof. Without loss of generality suppose thatν(T) = 1. Let y ∈ LX satisfies
the assumptions of Proposition. Denotey0 =
∫
T0
y and consider a functionδ(t) =




δ(t)dν(t). It is easily seen that




Consider a correspondenceZ(t) = X(t) ∩ Bδ0(y(t)) for t ∈ T1 = T \ T0. Since
y(t) ∈ X(t), Z(t) /= φ for t ∈ T1. It follows from the theory of measurable
correspondences (see e.g. Ioffe and Tikhomirov 1974), thatZ is a measurable
correspondence and hence by Mesurable Choice Theorem there existsx1 ∈ LZ|T1 .







Denoteu = − ∫T1 x1 +
∫
T1




existsx0 ∈ LX|T0 such that
∫
T0
x0 = y0 + u. Put
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x(t) =
{
x0(t), if t ∈ T0,
x1(t), if t ∈ T1.





Proof of Lemma.Put X(t) = {x ∈ Rl+ : x t x(t)} for t ∈ E. It follows from the













z0(t) for t ∈ E,
ω(t) for t ∈ E.
Then evidentlyz dominatesx via coalitonE.
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